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SCOPPOLA v. ITALY (No. 3): THE UNCERTAIN 
PROGRESS OF PRISONER VOTING  
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 
Javier R. Jaramillo* 
Abstract: This Comment examines European disenfranchisement of 
prisoners in light of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
guarantees a right to free elections through Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. 
While many European states continue the longstanding practice of deny-
ing wrongdoers the right to vote, at least under certain circumstances, 
this practice has come under increasing criticism over the last several 
decades. In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has decided several cases addressing this issue, but these decisions have 
failed to clarify under what circumstances it is permissible for a state to 
deny prisoners, and former prisoners, the right to vote. The ECtHR’s am-
biguous use of the margin of appreciation doctrine has only added to the 
confusion. This Comment suggests that the ECtHR should take a clear 
stand against prisoner disenfranchisement by only permitting the practice 
when truly necessary to protect the democratic process. 
Introduction 
 In May 2012, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) re-
leased its latest contribution to the muddled and oftentimes controver-
sial issue of prisoner voting rights.1 In Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR ruled that the Italian government had not vio-
lated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (ECHR) by permanently depriving an Italian citizen of the 
                                                                                                                      
* Javier R. Jaramillo is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc. 
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111044; see Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 
2), App. No. 74025/01, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 5–6 (2005) ( joint opinion of Wildhaber, 
Costa, Lorenzen, Kovler, and Jebens, JJ., dissenting); C.R.G. Murray, Playing for Time: Pris-
oner Disenfranchisement under the ECtHR after Hirst v. United Kingdom, 22 King’s L.J. 309, 
309–10 (2011) (noting the six–year impasse following the ECtHR’s ruling that U.K. disen-
franchisement of prisoners violated the ECHR); Controversy over Prisoner Voting Plans, Poli-
tics.co.uk (Mar. 4, 2005, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2005/ 
03/04/controversy-over-prisoner-voting-plans. 
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right to vote due to his conviction for murder.2 Despite its immediate 
outcome, the decision was not a complete defeat for advocates of pris-
oner voting rights.3 Significantly, the ECtHR affirmed a prior decision, 
Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), which had overturned the United King-
dom’s policy of disenfranchising all convicted criminals.4 
 The ruling has generated mixed reactions.5 Some observers of the 
ECtHR consider the ruling a setback for prisoner rights.6 Not only does 
continued disenfranchisement deny prisoners a fundamental right, but 
it permits the continued stigmatization of an already unpopular and 
excluded group of citizens.7 On the other hand, some see the ruling as 
a defeat for national sovereignty.8 By affirming Hirst (No. 2), the ruling 
curtails the right of national legislatures to fashion domestic policies 
free from the interference of a distant, supranational judiciary.9 Viewed 
in this context, the Scoppola (No. 3) decision is the latest in a series of 
cases highlighting the tension between the ECtHR’s role as a protector 
of human rights within member states and the need of those member 
states to implement policies that reflect unique national circum-
stances—what the ECtHR has termed the “margin of appreciation.”10 
                                                                                                                      
2 Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶ 110; see European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol (ETS No. 9), art. 
3, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free 
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the 
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”). 
3 See Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, ¶¶ 95–96 (reaffirming prior holding that the 
general, automatic, and indiscriminate disenfranchisement of prisoners violates Article 3 
of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR). 
4 See id. ¶ 96; Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 84–85. 
5 See, e.g., Patrick Wintour & Andrew Sparrow, Prisoner Voting Ruling from Strasbourg 
Must Be Followed, Says Attorney General, Guardian (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:00 EDT), http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/society/2012/oct/24/prisoner–voting–ruling–attorney–general?; Votes for 
Prisoners: Cameron Says UK Will Fight European Court, BBC News (May 24, 2012, 7:52 ET), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk–politics–18177776. 
6 See, e.g., Reuven Ziegler, Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3): A Step Backwards, Oxford Human 
Rights Hub (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=173. 
7 See, e.g., Susan Easton, Electing the Electorate: The Problem of Prisoner Disenfranchisement, 
69 Mod. L Rev. 443, 446 (2006); Jeffrey Reiman, Liberal and Republican Arguments Against 
the Disenfranchisement of Felons, Crim. Just. Ethics 3, 3 (2005). 
8 See, e.g., Stephen Pollard, Prisoners Voting: Time to Ask Who Governs Britain?, Express 
(May 24, 2012), http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/322045. 
9 See Ida Elisabeth Koch & Jen Vedsted–Hansen, International Human Rights and Na-
tional Legislatures—Conflict or Balance, 75 Nordic J. Int’l L. 3, 3–4 (2006); Dominic Raab, 
Britain Must Defy Europe over Votes for Prisoners, for the Very Soul of Our Democracy’s at Stake, 
Mail Online (updated Oct. 25, 2012, 02:37 EST) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/ 
article-2222701/Britain-defy-Europe-votes-prisoners-soul-democracys-stake.html. 
10 See Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 
Int’l L. & Pol. 843, 843–45 (1999). 
34 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:E. Supp. 
 Part I of this Comment offers a brief summary of the procedural 
and factual history of the Scoppola (No. 3) case. Part II provides a broader 
contextual understanding of the case by discussing the appropriate por-
tion of the ECHR, the relevance of the Hirst (No. 2) decision, and more 
generally, the disenfranchisement of prisoners as a social and govern-
mental policy. In addition, Part II highlights the conflict engendered by 
the desire of member states to shape national policy and the purpose of 
the ECtHR as a supranational vehicle for the protection of human 
rights. Part III offers a more detailed analysis of the Scoppola (No. 3) deci-
sion, with a critique directed at the ECtHR for its failure to follow up 
Hirst (No. 2) with a stronger stand against the disenfranchisement of 
prisoners. 
I. Background 
 On September 2, 1999, Franco Scoppola, an Italian citizen, initi-
ated a violent quarrel with his family that culminated in the murder of 
his wife.11 He became enraged after discovering that his children broke 
his cellular phone.12 When his wife called the police, Scoppola tried to 
throttle her with a telephone cord.13 After this attack failed, he fired 
several gunshots as his wife and children fled the residence.14 These 
gunshots killed Scoppola’s wife and injured one of his children. The 
Italian police arrested Scoppola the next day.15 
A. Domestic Legal Proceedings 
After an initial investigation, prosecutors charged Scoppola with a vari-
ety of crimes, including murder and attempted murder.16 At his pre-
liminary hearing, the presiding judge convicted him on all charges.17 
Ordinarily this conviction would have triggered a sentence of life im-
prisonment, but because Scoppola chose to stand trial under summary 
procedure, a streamlined trial process permitting a reduced sentence 
in the event of conviction, he received a shorter thirty-year sentence.18 
                                                                                                                      
11 Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 12 (2012), http://hudoc. 
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111044 
12 Id. ¶ 16. 
13 Id. ¶ 15. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. ¶ 12. 
16 Id. ¶ 13. 
17 Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶ 14. 
18 Id.; Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), App. No. 10249/03, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12 ¶ 127 (2010). 
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As a collateral punishment, his conviction included a lifetime ban from 
public office.19 
 Within the Italian legal system, bans from public office automati-
cally accompany a conviction for an offense punishable by three years or 
more of imprisonment.20 Under Article 29 of the Codice Penale Itali-
ano, the Italian Criminal Code, a sentence between three and five years 
requires a five-year ban from public office, while a sentence of five years 
or more requires a lifetime ban from public office.21 Presidential Decree 
No. 223/1967 extends these penalties by imposing a simultaneous dis-
qualification from voting.22 For persons under a temporary ban from 
public office, disenfranchisement lasts for the length of the ban, while 
persons under a permanent ban experience disenfranchisement for life. 
23 Due to the length of his sentence, Scoppola received a lifetime ban 
from public office, which translated into a lifetime ban from voting.24 
 Subsequently, both the prosecution and the defense appealed the 
sentence.25 On January 10, 2002, relying on a legislative decree that 
entered into force on the day of Scoppola’s conviction, the appeals 
court, the Rome Assize Court of Appeals, imposed a lengthier sen-
tence—life imprisonment.26 
B. Proceedings Before the ECtHR 
What followed were diverging stages of appeal in national and suprana-
tional courts, ultimately resulting in two separate decisions issued by 
the ECtHR.27 Filing a claim with the ECtHR on March 24, 2003, Scop-
pola argued that his life sentence violated Articles 6 and 7 of the 
ECHR.28 This application resulted in Scoppola v. Italy (No.2), a decision 
                                                                                                                      
19 Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, ¶¶ 14, 33–34. 
20 See id. ¶ 36. 
21 C.p. art. 29 (It.); Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶ 36. 
22 D.P.R. 20 Marzo 1967, n. 223 (It.); Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶ 35. It should 
be noted that due to the complexities of the Italian parliamentary system, it is not un-
common for the executive to implement its legislative agenda through presidential de-
crees. Vincent Della Sala &Amie Kreppel, Dancing Without a Lead: Legislative Decrees in Italy, 
in Executive Decree Authority 175, 175–76 ( John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart 
eds., 1998). 
23 Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶ 35. 
24 Id. ¶ 21. 
25 Id. ¶ 19. 
26 Id.; Scoppola (No. 2), 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 12 (Malinverni, J., concurring). 
27 See Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶¶ 20, 29–30, 110. 
28 Id. ¶ 29 (arguing that disenfranchisement as a collateral punishment violated his 
Aricle 6 right to a fair trial and his Article 7 right to no punishment without law). 
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issued on September 17, 2009, which restored the thirty-year sentence 
initially set by the preliminary hearing’s judge.29 
 In addition, Scoppola filed a second claim with the ECtHR on De-
cember 16, 2004, alleging that disenfranchisement following a criminal 
conviction violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR, which 
guarantees a right to free elections.30 The Second Section of the court 
heard this claim and rendered a decision on January 18, 2011.31 It 
found by a unanimous vote that his disenfranchisement violated the 
ECHR.32 On April 15, 2011, the Italian government successfully ap-
pealed the case to the Grand Chamber.33 Both Scoppola and the Italian 
government filed briefs, while the United Kingdom submitted a com-
ment as an interested third-party intervener.34 
 The United Kingdom’s interest in the outcome of Scoppola (No. 3) 
stemmed from a previous ECtHR decision, Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 
2), which held that a statute adopted by the House of Commons depriv-
ing all criminal offenders of the right to vote violated Article 3 of Pro-
tocol No. 1.35 In reaching this conclusion, the ECtHR rejected the 
United Kingdom’s argument that parties to the ECHR enjoy a “wide 
margin of appreciation” —or, in other words, a wide degree of lati-
tude—in complying with the terms of the treaty.36 In its comment to 
Scoppola (No. 3), the United Kingdom invited the ECtHR to reverse or 
modify the position it had adopted in Hirst (No. 2).37 
 The court explicitly declined to revisit its decision.38 Rather, it dis-
tinguished Hirst (No. 2) by noting the “general, automatic and indis-
criminate” nature of the disenfranchisement under scrutiny in that 
                                                                                                                      
29 Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶ 30; Scoppola (No. 2), 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 1, 153–
154. 
30 See Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶¶ 1, 3, 29. 
31 Id. ¶ 5. The ECtHR is organized along geographic lines into four distinct sections. 
Each member state appoints a single judge to the ECtHR who serves in one of the four 
sections. Paul L. McKaskle, The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How It Works, and 
Its Future, 40 U.S.F.L. Rev. 1, 14, 16 (2005). 
32 Id. ¶¶ 3–5. 
33 Id. ¶ 6. 
34 Id. ¶¶ 8–9, 75; Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 21; Merris Amos, The Dialogue 
Between United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of Human Rights, 61 Int’l & Comp. 
L.Q. 557, 578 (2012). Article 36 of the ECHR provides that a member state not party to a 
case may—in the interest of justice— “submit written comments or take part in hearings.” 
ECHR, supra note 2, art. 36. 
35 See Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶¶ 75–78; Murray, supra note 1, at 309. 
36 See Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶¶ 75–78; Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶¶ 47, 85. 
37 Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶ 78. 
38 Id. ¶¶ 94–96. 
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case.39 In contrast, it found the disenfranchisement challenged by 
Scoppola to be more proportionate and limited in scope.40 Ruling 
against Scoppola, the ECtHR found that the Italian government’s disen-
franchisement of prisoners fell within the “margin of appreciation” and 
thus did not violate Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.41 After Scoppola (No. 3), 
the breadth of the margin of appreciation doctrine remains uncertain.42 
The ECtHR’s decisions to date have not clarified when the margin of 
appreciation doctrine applies nor the degree of control over internal 
affairs that the doctrine grants to ECHR member states.43 While Euro-
pean states will continue to invoke the margin of appreciation to defend 
laws disenfranchising criminal offenders, it is unclear how successful this 
defense will be.44 
II. Discussion 
 The disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners has a lengthy legal 
and historical provenance, tracing its roots as far back as the ancient 
Greeks and Romans.45 Living in a society that valued both citizenship 
and loyalty to the polis, or city-state, the ancient Greeks saw fit to pun-
ish certain crimes with “infamy” —the wholesale revocation of such civ-
ic rights as court appearances, military service, and voting.46 The an-
cient Romans likewise sanctioned the revocation of civic rights as a 
                                                                                                                      
39 Id. ¶ 108. 
40 See id. ¶¶ 106, 108–109. 
41 Id. ¶ 110. 
42 See id. ¶¶ 108–109 (noting that Italian law neither indiscriminately disenfranchises 
prisoners nor irrevocably deprives them of the right to vote following release); Jan Kratochvíl, 
The Inflation of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights, 29 Neth. Q. 
Hum. Rts. 324, 324–25 (2011); Adam Wagner, European Court of Human Rights Retreats but 
Doesn’t Surrender on Prisoner Votes, UK Human Rights Blog (May 22, 2012), http://ukhuman 
rightsblog.com/2012/05/22/european-court-of-human-rights-retreats-but-doesnt-surrender-
on-prisoner-votes/. 
43 See Kratochvíl, supra note 42, at 324–26. 
44 See Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶ 102 (noting that the ECtHR must review na-
tional legislation disenfranchising prisoners on a case-by-case basis); Kratochvíl, supra note 
42, at 330 (articulating the uncertainty the ECtHR’s application of the margin of apprecia-
tion doctrine); see, e.g., Frodl v. Austria, App. No. 20201/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 20(2010), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-98132; (arguing that Aus-
tria’s prisoner disenfranchisement policy fell within the margin of appreciation); Hirst (No. 
2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 47 (arguing that the United Kingdom’s prisoner disenfran-
chisement policy fell within the margin of appreciation). 
45 See Easton, supra note 7 at 443. 
46 K. Cherry & E.A. Goerner, Does Aristotle’s Polis Exist ‘By Nature’?, 27 Hist. Pol. 
Thought 563, 566 (2006); see Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project: The Collateral Con-
sequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929, 941–42 (1970) (quotations omitted). 
38 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:E. Supp. 
form of punishment for criminal behavior, although under Roman law, 
the loss of rights tended to be less wholesale.47 The reach and influence 
of Roman thought ensured that civil disability would survive as a means 
of punishment within the political entities that succeeded the Roman 
Empire.48 
A. The Theory and Practice of Prisoner Disenfranchisement  
 Many modern European states still impose some form of criminal 
disenfranchisement.49 Although seventeen European states impose no 
voting restrictions on prisoners, eleven ban all prisoners from voting 
and twelve ban some prisoners from voting.50 Even in states that deprive 
convicted prisoners of the right to vote, disenfranchisement in practice 
may be rare.51 Since the vast majority of states that deny suffrage to all 
prisoners are former republics of the Soviet Union, there is a marked 
policy divide between Eastern Europe and much of the rest of continen-
tal Europe.52 
 For states that exclude only some prisoners from voting, the crite-
ria for disenfranchisement varies.53 Some states—Italy, Belgium, 
Greece, and Luxemburg—condition disenfranchisement on the dura-
tion of the prison sentence.54 Other states focus on the gravity or na-
ture of the crime.55 Poland disenfranchises prisoners who have commit-
ted intentional crimes when their sentences are more than three years 
                                                                                                                      
47 See Grant, supra note 46, at 941–42 (“Civil disabilities as a consequence of crime can 
be traced to ancient Greece. . . . The Romans of a later age adopted the Greek practice of 
‘infamy’ and refined it into laws imposing specific disabilities . . . .”). 
48 See id. at 942 (noting the spread and continued influence of Roman legal concepts 
even after the dissolution of the Roman Empire). 
49 See Laleh Ispahani, Voting Rights and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Laws, in Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Per-
spective 25, 25–26 (Alec C. Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus eds., 2009). 
50 Id. at 26–27. The countries permitting all prisoners to vote are Austria, Albania, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Mace-
donia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland; the coun-
tries permitting some prisoners to vote are Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and Romania; and the coun-
tries that deny all prisoners the right to vote are Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Kos-
ovo, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Id. 
51 See id. (noting, for instance, that prisoners in Norway seldom lose the right to vote). 
52 See id. at 27, 31. 
53 See id. at 28–30. 
54 Id. at 27. 
55 See Ispahani, supra note 49, at 28–30. 
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in length.56 France disenfranchises prisoners convicted of “crimes of 
moral turpitude or crimes against the public.”57  
 States that disenfranchise criminals rely on a number of traditional 
rationales.58 Many believe that a criminal’s decision to violate the social 
contract merits loss of the right to fully participate in the political 
community.59 Others argue that convicted criminals have demonstrated 
a basic lack of civic responsibility that disqualifies them from exercising 
the right to vote.60 Under this conception, criminal disenfranchisement 
is not a punitive measure, but rather an essentially regulatory device 
that allows a state to preserve the integrity of the electoral process.61 
B. Criticism of Prisoner Disenfranchisement 
 Despite its grounding in historical practice, the compatibility of 
disenfranchisement with democratic values has come under increasing 
fire from modern scholars, legal observers, and judges.62 This legal ca-
dre has questioned whether a government can provide a state interest 
sufficient to justify the deprivation of a fundamental right such as vot-
ing.63 Under this view, it is impermissible for a democratic society em-
bracing universal suffrage to exclude some citizens out of concern that 
they will potentially vote in a manner considered undesirable.64 Accord-
ingly, neither a punitive nor a regulatory rationalization for disenfran-
chisement is justified.65 
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. at 29. 
57 Id. 
58 See Adebayo Randle, Prisoner Voting Rights and the Social Contract, 1 Dublin Legal 
Rev. Q. 60, 60 (2011); Reiman, supra note 7, at 3. 
59 Randle, supra note 58, at 60; Reiman, supra note 7, at 3. 
60 Reiman, supra note 7, at 3. 
61 See Alec C. Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus, Introduction, in Criminal Disenfran-
chisement in an International Perspective, supra note 49, at 12–13. 
62 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 78 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“There 
is certainly no basis for asserting that ex-felons have any less interest in the democratic 
process than any other citizen.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Rep-
resentation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1169–70 
(2004) (arguing that felon disenfranchisement punishes communities, as well as individu-
als, and taints the political process); Randle, supra note 58, at 68 (asserting that prisoner 
disenfranchisement interferes with rehabilitation); Reiman, supra note 7, at 4–5 (noting 
the disparate impact of prisoner disenfranchisement on minority groups). 
63 Jaime Fellner & Marc Mauer, The Sentencing Project & Human Right 
Watch, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Law in the 
United States 14 (1998) (arguing that a compelling interest test should be applied to 
felon disenfranchisement laws). 
64 See id. at 15–16. 
65 See Randle, supra note 58, at 68–69. 
40 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:E. Supp. 
 In addition, prisoner disenfranchisement may threaten the de-
mocratic process it seeks to protect.66 Rather than preventing crime 
and promoting civic responsibility, disenfranchisement may contribute 
to feelings of isolation and stigmatization that inhibit the reentry of for-
mer prisoners into society.67 Moreover, voter disenfranchisement can 
disproportionately affect minorities or other disadvantaged groups 
which are statistically more likely to be convicted of qualifying crimes.68 
 Meeting resistance from domestic political and legal institutions, 
prisoners in multiple European states have sought to vindicate a right 
to vote in the ECtHR.69 They have pointed to Article 3 of Protocol No. 
1 of the ECHR, which provides: “[t]he . . . Parties undertake to hold 
free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions 
which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature.”70 These claims have met with some suc-
cess.71 Although the text of Article 3 does not specifically address the 
rights of prisoners, the ECtHR has issued multiple decisions affirming 
its application to incarcerated citizens.72 Furthermore, in Hirst v. United 
Kingdom (No. 2), the ECtHR explicitly noted that voting is a right and 
not a privilege.73 On the other hand, the ECtHR has recognized that 
even a right may be limited under compelling circumstances.74 
                                                                                                                      
66 See id. at 68; Reiman, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
67 See Fellner & Mauer, supra note 63, at 16; Christopher Uggen et al., Punishment and 
Social Exclusion: National Differences in Prisoner Disenfranchisement, in Criminal Disenfran-
chisement in an International Perspective, supra note 49, at 74–75. 
68 See Karlan, supra note 62, at 1156–57; Darren Wheelock, Collateral Consequences and 
Racial Inequality, 21 J. Contemp. Crim. Just. 82, 84 (2005). 
69 See, e.g., Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1–3, 24–28 (2012), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111044; Frodl v. Austria, App. 
No. 20201/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 3, 15 (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-98132; Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, 2005-IX Eur. 
Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1–3, 14–17. 
70 ECHR, supra note 2; see, e.g., Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05 ¶ 3; Frodl, App. No. 
20201/04 ¶ 3; Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 3. 
71 See, e.g., Frodl, App. No. 20201/04 ¶ 36 (finding that Austrian disenfranchisement 
policy violated Article 3); Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 85 (finding that U.K. disen-
franchisement policy violated Article 3). 
72 See Frodl, App. No. 20201/04 ¶ 36; Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 85; Murray, 
supra note 1, at 311. 
73 Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 59. 
74 Id. ¶ 60. 
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C. Role of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
 For convicted criminals, the boundaries of the right to vote con-
tinue to be poorly defined.75 Part of this confusion stems from the EC-
tHR’s reliance on the margin of appreciation doctrine.76 Under the 
doctrine, the ECtHR wields its judicial authority in a manner that gives 
national governments appropriate discretion in setting domestic poli-
cies.77 The doctrine originated in French administrative law as a rule of 
judicial deference to administrative decisions.78 The ECtHR adopted 
the doctrine through its jurisprudence rather than the language of the 
ECHR.79 It first invoked the doctrine in relation to Article 15 of the 
ECHR, a provision allowing states to deviate from the ECHR during 
national security emergencies.80 Later decisions applied the margin of 
appreciation doctrine to other portions of the ECHR, including Article 
3 of Protocol No. 1.81 
 Although the heterogeneous nature of the parties to the ECHR 
makes some flexibility desirable in ECtHR decision making, the margin 
of appreciation doctrine conflicts with the ECtHR’s role as a suprana-
tional protector of human rights.82 Because of the ambiguity this con-
flict creates, the extent to which convicted criminals are entitled to par-
ticipate in the electoral process remains unclear.83 In addition, member 
states lack clear guidance from the ECtHR on how to fashion domestic 
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policies that appropriately restrict the voting rights of prisoners without 
engendering human rights violations.84 
III. Analysis 
 Although the ECtHR declined to revisit the Hirst v. United Kingdom 
(No. 2) decision and thus affirmed its prior ruling prohibiting a blanket 
ban on prisoner voting, the Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3) decision was a set-
back for prisoner voting rights.85 A number of observers of the ECtHR 
argued that the Scoppola (No. 3) decision functioned as a political com-
promise.86 After strong opposition to implementation of the Hirst (No. 
2) decision by the U.K. government, which was reluctant to overturn 
centuries of historical practice, the ECtHR understandably felt pres-
sured to take a more incremental approach to prisoner voting rights.87 
 Practical realities may play an important role in the ECtHR’s past 
decision making.88 There is a marked contrast between the strong rhet-
oric employed by the ECtHR in defense of prisoner voting rights and 
the faltering steps it has taken to protect these rights.89 In Hirst (No. 2), 
for example, the ECtHR described “[a]ny departure from the principle 
of universal suffrage” as potentially damaging to the democratic proc-
ess.90 Indeed, because it considered the U.K. blanket ban on prisoner 
voting so antithetical to the right to free elections, the ECtHR found 
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that the policy fell outside even the widest permissible “margin of ap-
preciation.”91 Having issued this strong indictment of prisoner disen-
franchisement, the ECtHR appeared poised to shift European states 
away from the practice.92 Its ruling in Scoppola (No. 3) proved other-
wise.93 
A. Inconsistent Decisions Undermine the ECtHR’s Credibility 
 The Scoppola (No. 3) decision conflicts with past pronouncements 
by the ECtHR.94 In Frodl v. Austria, the ECtHR noted that, with the ex-
ception of liberty, a prisoner continues to enjoy the same rights and 
privileges under the ECHR as any other citizen.95 Moreover, in Hirst 
(No. 2), the ECtHR held that indiscriminate disenfranchisement of con-
victed felons violated the ECHR.96 But aside from the safe haven it cre-
ates for prisoner serving sentences of less than three years, the Italian 
approach suffers from a similar deficiency.97 All prisoners serving more 
than three years lose the right to vote, while those sentenced to terms 
of five years or more receive automatic disenfranchisement for life.98 
  The policies in Hirst (No. 2) and Scoppola (No. 3) were similarly in-
discriminate, yet only one was held in violation of the ECHR.99 In ana-
lyzing the Scoppola (No. 3) decision, other considerations may have 
caused the ECtHR to stray from its strict adherence to the ECHR.100 Al-
though Scoppola (No. 3) received a mixed reception in the United King-
dom, at least some observers viewed the decision as proof that the 
United Kingdom’s refusal to comply with Hirst (No. 2) had worked.101 
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Many critics of the decision reached the same conclusion: in the face of 
strong British opposition, the ECtHR retreated.102 
 The ECtHR may have responded to pressure from the United 
Kingdom because of its dependency on the goodwill of national gov-
ernments for enforcement of its rulings.103 On January 26, 2011, for 
example, a resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe admonished a number of countries, including Greece, Italy, 
Poland, and Russia, for “extremely worrying delays” in the implementa-
tion of decisions issued by the ECtHR.104 It is hardly surprising that the 
ECtHR should be concerned about noncompliance by member 
states.105 Nevertheless, because the ECtHR is a judicial rather than legis-
lative body, overtly political posturing may not only undermine the EC-
tHR’s moral authority, but also vitiate the very rights that the ECtHR is 
specifically obliged to protect.106 
B. The ECtHR Should Prohibit ECHR Member States from Disenfranchising 
Prisoners Absent a Convincing Regulatory Reason  
 A stronger stance against prisoner disenfranchisement would not 
require a radical shift by either the ECtHR or the ECHR member 
states.107 The ECtHR has already declared in multiple decisions that the 
right to free elections guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the 
ECHR prohibits the disenfranchisement of at least some prisoners.108 In 
addition, many states allow all prisoners to vote, without disastrous con-
sequences to the democratic process: numerous European states— in-
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cluding Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Serbia— cur-
rently permit all prisoners to vote.109 
 Because the ECtHR has already held that the right to free elections 
is relevant to the question of prisoner disenfranchisement, in any fu-
ture cases raising this issue, it should go a step further and hold that 
states may not bar prisoners from voting—unless there is a convincing 
regulatory reason for doing so.110 Under this regime, a state should 
only disenfranchise prisoners under extraordinary circumstances when 
necessary to protect the democratic or electoral process.111 
 Although this approach would be unpopular in the states that con-
tinue to disenfranchise prisoners, it logically follows from the weight 
the ECtHR has placed on universal suffrage and the participation of all 
citizens in the democratic process.112 Because Article 3 protects the 
right to free elections, and voting is integral to the exercise of this right, 
the use of prisoner disenfranchisement as a tool of social or criminal 
policy should necessarily be limited.113 Thus, a punitive rationale for 
disenfranchisement fails altogether in light of other forms of punish-
ment available to the state.114 
 To the extent, however, that concerns might remain about the ef-
fect of extensive prisoner participation in the electoral process, the 
margin of appreciation doctrine would still have a role to play.115 While 
the presumption would be that all prisoners should have the right to 
vote, if a state could show unique national circumstances requiring 
some restrictions on prisoner suffrage, the ECtHR would have the nec-
essary discretion to uphold limited exceptions to universal suffrage.116 
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By analogy to its early jurisprudence invoking the margin of apprecia-
tion doctrine, the ECtHR would permit limited derogations from Arti-
cle 3 only to the extent necessary to protect against dangers threaten-
ing the electoral process.117 
 Under this regime, the ECtHR would give force to an interpreta-
tion of Article 3 that accords all citizens, including the incarcerated, the 
right to vote.118 Nevertheless, as it should, the margin of appreciation 
doctrine would continue to provide flexibility for European states con-
fronting unique national circumstances.119 Thus, if a state’s disenfran-
chisement policy were truly necessary to protect the integrity of the 
democratic or electoral process, the ECtHR would have the discretion 
to consider the merits of the state’s arguments.120 
Conclusion 
 The ECtHR missed an opportunity in Scoppola (No. 3) to provide 
clarity and direction on the question of prisoner disenfranchisement. 
While its prior decision in Hirst (No. 2) stands for the proposition that a 
blanket ban on prisoner suffrage violates Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the 
ECHR, it remains unclear after Scoppola (No. 3) what other forms of 
prisoner disenfranchisement are impermissible. Given the seemingly 
political nature of the Scoppola (No. 3) decision, the ECtHR did nothing 
to advance either the progress of prisoner voting rights or its own 
credibility as the judicial body tasked with giving life to the ECHR. 
When the ECtHR addresses this issue in future cases, as it must, it 
should give force to its past rhetoric by finding that Article 3 guarantees 
suffrage for all citizens, including prisoners. 
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